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THE HARDNESS OF THE PAST: 
A REPLY TO REICHENBACH 
William Hasker 
Bruce Reichenbach has presented an interesting and challenging set of objections 
to my argument for the incompatibility of human freedom and comprehensive 
divine foreknowledge. l All of his objections ultimately fail, in my opinion, but 
they do serve to exhibit the complexity of the problem. And I think it is only 
by examining objections patiently, carefully, and accurately that we can advance 
this vexed issue towards a resolution. 
Reichenbach begins by asserting the familiar claim that facts about God's past 
beliefs are "soft facts" about the past and thus may be within our power to affect 
(though not to alter-another matter entirely). He gives an exposition, partial 
but so far accurate, of my explication of the distinction between hard and soft 
facts, and he notes my claim that 
(14) Yahweh has always believed that Clarence will have a cheese 
omelet for breakfast tomorrow 
is a hard fact. But Reichenbach objects to this: Yahweh is essentially God, and 
thus essentially omniscient, and thus cannot hold a false belief. "But then (14) 
is a candidate for being a soft fact, for (14) is not future-indifferent" (HO, p. 87). 
Reichenbach anticipates my objection to this: According to my explication of 
the hard-soft fact distinction, considerations about the essential properties of 
individuals are not relevant to establishing whether or not propositions are future-
indifferent. 2 Reichenbach, however, demurs: 
It would seem that [de re considerations] are relevant in those cases 
where [they] are directly germane to the determination of the hardness 
or softness of a fact, that is, germane to determining whether it is in 
someone's power to make the proposition under consideration false .. 
. . The compatibilist then can argue that de re considerations are relevant 
to and cannot be excluded from considerations regarding Yahweh's 
beliefs about the future, for since his beliefs must be true ... , his 
beliefs about the future cannot be future-indifferent; their truth depends 
necessarily on the future (HO, p. 88). 
As Reichenbach recognizes, my criteria for the hard-soft fact distinction require 
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that de re necessary truths not be considered in identifying future-indifferent 
propositions. The reason for this, as I clearly indicate, is that considering de re 
necessary truths in determining this would eliminate virtually all candidates for 
the status offuture-indifferent propositions, thus making the hard-soft fact distinc-
tion pointless. Reichenbach seems to see this, at least in part; he admits that "a 
universal admission of de re considerations effectively destroys the usefulness 
of making a distinction between hard and soft facts" (HO, p. 88), so he wants 
to consider only some of the de re necessary truths as relevant. But so far as I 
can see, he gives us no clue as to how we should determine these, and distinguish 
them from the others which must be excluded in order to preserve the hard-soft 
fact distinction. He admits that "to invoke an exception to a general application 
might be deemed suspicious" (HO, p.88). I couldn't agree more completely! 
Towards the end of his paper Reichenbach returns to the theme of hard and 
soft facts-but not, I fear, in a way which helps his cause. We can all readily 
understand that the very same event of Luther's birth, without any change in its 
intrinsic characteristics, can count either as Luther's-being-born-502-years-
before-Reichenbach-writes or as Luther's-being-born-502-years-before-Reichen-
bach-does-not-write, depending on what happens 502 years later. But can we at 
all understand that the very same event of God's believing can, without change 
in any of its intrinsic characteristics, count either as God's-believing-that-Clar-
ence-will-eat-an-omelet or as God's-believing-that-Clarence-will-not-eat-an-
omelet? If we cannot, then the project of classifying God's beliefs as soft facts 
is in deep trouble. 
All this, however, is merely a curtain-raiser for Reichenbach's principal objec-
tion, which is that my main argument for incompatibilism rests on an equivoca-
tion. The steps in which he finds the equivocation are the following: 
(B3') God has always believed that Clarence will have a cheese omelet 
tomorrow. 
(B4) If God has always believed a certain thing, it is not in anyone's 
power to bring it about that God has not always believed that thing. 
(B5) Therefore, it is not in Clarence's power to bring it about that God 
has not always believed that he would have a cheese omelet for breakfast. 
Reichenbach writes: 
The phrase" ... bring it about that God has not always believed that 
thing" could either mean (a) bring it about that God has never believed 
that thing, or (b) bring it about that it once was but no longer is the 
case that God believed it ... in the sense of a person somehow altering, 
retroactively, a fact about God's prior belief .... The truth of (B4) 
under the first interpretation [(a)] does not follow--as Hasker claims 
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the truth of (B4) does-from the unalterability of the past, for it has 
nothing to do with altering the past, but rather with bringing about the 
past. The truth of (B4) under the second [(b)] follows from the unaltera-
bility of the past. Now whereas (B4) in sense (b) is true, (B4) in sense 
(a) is not true, for given the antecedent it is still in my or Clarence's 
power to bring it about that God has never believed a certain thing. It 
is only that that power has not been exercised. If it had been exercised, 
then God would not always have (never have) believed that thing (HO, 
p. 89). 
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So (B4) in sense (b) is true but irrelevant to my argument, whereas in sense (a), 
which is needed for the argument, it is not true. 
What shall we say to this? Note, first of all, that a distinction very similar to 
the one Reichenbach makes is indeed noted in my paper. Consider the following 
two kinds of cases: 
I. X occurred at T I, and at T 2 A brings it about that X occurred at T I' 
II. X did not occur atT1 , and at T2 A brings it about that X occurred at T I . 
The power to perform the sorts of actions described in (I) is called in my paper 
"power to bring about past events which have in fact taken place," whereas the 
power to perform the sorts of actions described in (II) is called "power to bring 
about events which might have taken place in the past but in fact did not" (FN, 
p. 145). The latter sort of power may well be termed the power to alter the past, 
and Reichenbach and I agree that it is impossible for anyone to have such a 
power. Is the former sort of power also impossible? In the present context there 
is no need to decide this; what is important to note is that nowhere in my paper 
do I argue against the possibility of such a power, nor does anything in my 
argument for incompatibilism depend on the assumption that such powers are 
impossible. For purposes of the present discussion, then, I am willing to assume 
that powers of the first type, powers to bring about past events which have in 
fact taken place, are possible and indeed that some people may actually have them. 
So far, then, there is a surprising amount of agreement between Reichenbach 
and myself about the powers in question: We agree that powers to alter the past 
are impossible. and we also agree (at least for present purposes) that powers to 
bring about past events which have in fact taken place may be possible. What 
remains to be decided is this: Which sort of power over the past is relevant to 
the interpretation of (B4) and (B5) in my argument? If it is the latter type of 
power which is relevant, then (B4) is false and my argument fails. If on the 
other hand it is the power to alter the past which is relevant, then (B4) is true 
and the argument succeeds. 
But the answer to this question is obvious. What is at stake in (B4) is our 
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power to bring it about that God has never held a certain belief, given that God 
has in fact always held that belief. Evidently this cannot be a power to bring 
about a past event which has in fact occurred; it must be, rather, the power to 
bring about something in the past which did not occur-that is, it must be the 
power to alter the past. And since it is agreed by all concerned that such powers 
are impossible, (B4) is vindicated. 
Why doesn't Reichenbach agree with this? The answer, I believe, is that what 
he designates as the power to bring about the past is yet another kind of power, 
distinct from both of the kinds discussed above: It is neither the impossible power 
to alter the past, nor is it merely (!) the power to bring about past events which 
have already occurred. What sort of power this is, is a question to be carefully 
considered. Before going into this, however, I want to consider one other line 
of argument which he pursues. 
Reichenbach cites, with apparent approval, my notion of a "precluding cir-
cumstance"-something about the circumstances under which one acts which 
eliminates the possibility of acting in some particular way. He does not, however, 
approve of the use I make of this notion. He writes: 
Hasker asks, "Why is it that [Clarence] (apparently) lacks freedom to 
do X at T 2? Because God has always believed that [Clarence] would 
do X at T 2, which logically precludes [Clarence] from refraining from 
doing X at T2" [paraphrased from FN, p. 147]. But one might carry 
this another step. What is it that precludes God from having always 
believed that Clarence would not do X at T 2? It is that Clarence does 
X at T2. That is, from God's perspective (that of foreknowledge) it is 
as if Clarence has already done X at T2. Thus, what it is that apparently 
precludes Clarence from refraining from doing X at T 2, is Clarence 
doing X at T 2' But this relation-Clarence actually doing X at T 2 
entailing that Clarence cannot refrain from doing X at T 2--does not 
then remove Clarence's freedom regarding doing X at T 2' It says nothing 
about the conditions under which Clarence does X at T2 (HO, p. 90). 
On the face of it, this seems to be a remarkable piece of reasoning. Stripped to 
essentials, its form seems to be: P precludes not-Q. But, Q precludes not-Po So, 
it is really Q that precludes not-Q; therefore, P does not preclude not-Q.3 
Possibly this disaster is supposed to be averted by the assertion that from 
God's perspective it is "as if' Clarence has already done X at T2. Now just what 
this "as if' comes to is not at all clear to me: but one thing is clear: As a matter 
offact, Clarence has not "already" done X at T2 ; rather, he has made no decision 
at all at T 2 until T 2 actually arrives. The circumstances under which he makes 
the decision include the fact that God has always believed that he will do X at 
T2, and the options which are open to him are all and only the things that it is 
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possible for him to do, given those circumstances.' These options, needless to 
say, do not include refraining from doing X at T 2' 
But what of Reichenbach's claim that we do, indeed, have power over the 
past of a kind that renders (B4) (in the relevant sense) false? What kind of power 
can this be? It cannot be merely (!) the power to bring about past events which 
have already occurred, for that is a power we possess only when the event to 
be brought about has actually occurred in the past, whereas the power Reichenbach 
has in mind is not limited in this way. But neither can it be the power to alter 
the past, for Reichenbach admits this to be impossible. What else is there? 
What we have to keep in mind here is that "there is a sense of 'power' in 
which a person's powers (normally) remain more or less constant, while the 
possibilities of their being exercised come and go" (FN, p. 152). The power 
over the past which Reichenbach has in mind is, I believe, of this kind. 6 Clarence's 
power to bring about that God has not always believed that Clarence would have 
a cheese omelet for breakfast is not a power which Clarence has only in those 
worlds in which God lacks that belief. No, Clarence has that power also in the 
worlds in which God does believe he will have a cheese omelet for breakfast, 
but in those worlds it is impossible for him to exercise that power, for to do so 
would be to change the past, which is impossible. The power itself, then, is not 
limited to worlds in which the event has already occurred-but the possibility 
of the power's being exercised is so limited. 
This, of course is the sense in which 'power' is generally used by soft deter-
minists ("compatibilists" in the usual sense of that term, when it has not [as in 
the present discussion] been preempted for a narrower use). Indeed, this use of 
'power' is one of the crucial distinctions between the soft determinist and liber-
tarian views of free will. I certainly have the power to turn off the Monday night 
football game and get some needed sleep---nobody is compelling me to watch 
it, I keep watching it because I want to, if I were to choose to turn it off I could 
do so, and so on. Nevertheless, it may well be that my state of mind at this 
particular time is such that it is impossible for me actually to exercise my power 
to tum the game off. It is just this sense of 'power' which fits Reichenbach's 
use of the term. No doubt Clarence does, in this sense, have the "power" to 
refrain from eating an omelet. But the worlds in which he exercises this power 
are, one and all, worlds that are different from the actual world with respect to 
events that lie already in the past. In the actual world, God's past belief about 
what Clarence would do precludes his exercising the power to refrain from eating 
an omelet. 
Would it not be a striking confirmation of the incompatibilist's thesis 
if it turns out that a compatibilist who wishes to affirm our power over 
the past but to deny our power to change the past, finds himself compelled 
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to use crucial terms like 'can' and 'power' in a way which generates 
"free will" only in the soft determinist and not in the libertarian sense 
of that term? (FN, p. 153) 
NOTES 
1. "Hasker on Omniscience," Faith and Philosophy 4 (1987), pp, 86-92, henceforth cited in the 
text by "HO" and the page number. Reichenbach's criticisms are directed at my article, "Foreknow-
ledge and Necessity," Faith and Philosophy 2 (1985), pp. 121-157, cited hereafter with "FN' and 
the page number. 
2. See FN. p. 133. In FN I speak of de dicto and de re necessary truths. with only the former being 
relevant to determining the future-indifferent propositions. Because of the variety of ways in which 
the dt' dicta-de re distinction is used, however, I now prefer to speak of "conceptually necessary" 
and "metaphysically necessary" propositions. For more on this see my "Hard Facts and Theological 
Fatalism," Nous, forthcoming. 
3. In correspondence about this Response, Reichenbach restates his point by saying that "it is only 
in a trivial way that P precludes Q." 
4. I don't think Reichenbach's "time travel" example (HO, pp. 90-91) is helpful here. It should be 
abundantly clear by now that the fact that such stories are in some way imaginable and intuitively 
graspable says nothing about their logical coherence. 
5. Of course it does not matter that Clarence does not know what it is that God believes; it is no 
doubt often the case that we are causally prevented from taking a certain course of action, and yet 
are unaware of the fact. Such lack of awareness in no way allows the precluded action to be included 
among the things it is possible for us to do. 
6. Tht: same is true of the power over the past advocated by George Mavrodes (see his "Is the Past 
Unpreventable?" Faith and Philosophy I (1984), pp. 131-146; see also my comments in FN, pp. 
144-154). 
